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SPECIAL EDUCATION DUE PROCESS: HEARING 
OFFICER BACKGROUND AND CASE VARIABLE 
EFFECTS ON DECISIONS OUTCOMES 
Geoffrey F. Schultz*& Joseph R. McKinney** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to review the effect that hear-
ing officer background, and case variables have on decisions 
rendered during Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA) due process hearings. 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 
charges state education agencies with the responsibility of as-
suring that all eligible children are provided with a free, ap-
propriate, public education. 1 The substantive due process right 
to a free, appropriate, public education is undergirded by a 
comprehensive set of procedural rights, rules, and require-
z 
ments mandated by federal law. At the core of these proce-
dural safeguards stands the due process hearing. 
When a parent and a public education agency disagree on 
matters related to the provisions of free, appropriate, public 
education for a child with a disability or a child suspected of 
having a disability, either party may initiate an "impartial" due 
process hearing.3 The impartiality of the due process hearing is 
maintained by ensuring that the hearing officers are free from 
personal and professional pressures at both the local and state 
levels. To this end, the IDEA requires that "a hearing ... may 
not be conducted by an employee of the state education agency 
or the local educational agency (LEA) involved in the education 
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2. See id. 
3. See id. § 1415(a)-(e). 
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or care of the child."4 
The federal regulations implementing the IDEA specifically 
address the issue of an impartial hearing officer as follows: 
Impartial hearing officer: 
(a) A hearing may not be conducted-
(!) By a person who is an employee of the State agency or 
the local education agency that is involved in the educa-
tional care of the child; or 
(2) By any person having a personal or professional inter-
est that would conflict with his or her objectivity in the 
hearing. 
(b) A person who otherwise qualifies to conduct a hearing un-
der paragraph (a) of this section is not an employee of the 
agency solely because he or she is paid by the agency to serve 
as a hearing officer. 
(c) Each public agency shall keep a list of the persons who 
serve as hearing officers. The list must include a statement of 
the qualifications of each of those persons. 5 
Neither the 1997 amendments to the IDEA nor its 1999 im-
plementing regulations address the impartiality of hearing offi-
cers or the integrity of the due process hearing system. How-
ever, the Department of Education (DOE) has received several 
specific requests to amend the IDEA regulation on hearing offi-
cers. These requests were divided into two categories. The first 
category proposed changing the qualification requirements for 
hearing officers, and the second involved publishing the quali-
fications of each individual hearing officer. 6 
Within the first category, the DOE received requests to ex-
clude those individuals who are current employees of local edu-
cation agencies or who were employed by a state education 
agency or a local employment agency within the past five years, 
from eligibility to serve as hearing officers. Requests were also 
received to exclude from service as hearing officers, attorneys 
who primarily represented school districts or parents in IDEA 
actions. 7 
4. See id. 
5. 34 C.F.R. § 300.508 (1999). 
6. See id. 
7. See id. 
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Although the DOE considered these amendment requests, 
it refused to amend the IDEA regulations on hearing officer 
eligibility. The DOE maintains that current IDEA regulations, 
coupled with state ethics rules for attorneys and judges, are 
sufficient to ensure hearing officer impartiality. The DOE said 
that states that had no formal ethical requirements for admin-
istrative hearing officers would be left alone to address the is-
sues. Further, the DOE specifically found that prior employees 
of local or state educational agencies should not automatically 
be prevented from serving as hearing officers, absent a per-
sonal or professional conflict of interest that impacts that per-
son's objectivity. Comparing hearing officers to judges, the 
DOE noted that hearing officers are capable of independently 
deciding whether they have conflicts of interest that would af-
fect their impartiality. 
The second category of requests for amendment of the IDEA 
regulation of hearing officers focused on the need to establish 
national and state training and competency standards. The 
proposed standards would include both DOE and State offici-
ated training and examinations. Once these standards were 
implemented, only those hearing officers who successfully met 
the requirements could qualify to serve as a hearing officer at 
due process hearings. Prior to the commencement of a due pro-
cess hearing, each party would be provided a list of qualified 
hearing officers along with the hearing officer's credentials. 
From this list, the parties would choose the hearing officer. 
Some states have already implemented these recommenda-
tions, so far as state training and examination are concerned.8 
Several comments were received asking that the DOE 
amend the IDEA to allow parents or their representatives to be 
present at the selection meetings that determine which hearing 
officers will be included on the "qualified list". It was also re-
quested that the list of hearing officer's qualifications be up-
dated annually, and that the hearing officer's impartiality be 
determined by an objective standard, such as a state's Judicial 
Code of Conduct.9 
As with the other requests, the DOE was not persuaded to 
amend the IDEA regulations to permit parents or their repre-
sentatives to be present at the "qualified list" selection meet-
8. 34 C.F.R. § 300.508 (1999). 
9. See id. 
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ings. The DOE said that decisions about the selection, training, 
and use of "qualified lists" should be left to the individual 
states. The DOE pointed out that because hearing officers' de-
cisions are subject to appeal and fair judicial review, and be-
cause poor decisions create high litigation expenses, states 
have a strong incentive to: 1) choose qualified hearing officers 
that meet standards of expertise; and 2) conduct appropriate 
training programs. 
II. CASE LAW 
The issue of "impartiality" in the assignment of hearing of-
ficers has been the subject of a number of judicial decisions. 
This line of cases, as well as several Office of Civil Rights rul-
ings on impartiality under Section 504, have shed some light 
on who may not serve as a hearing officer. In Mayson v.Teague, 
the Eleventh Circuit held that officers of local school boards 
were employees of agencies involved in the education and care 
of the child. 10 The Eleventh Circuit went on to say that these 
individuals had either personal or professional interests in the 
type of educational assistance extended to children with dis-
abilities, and thus were not sufficiently impartial to serve on 
due process hearing panels.l 1 The court ruled further that uni-
versity personnel involved in the formulation and regulation of 
state policies were not sufficiently impartial to serve as due 
process hearing officers in special education disputes. 12 
In Leon v. Michigan Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit 
held that administrators and attorneys employed by one dis-
trict can indeed preside over hearings involving a separate 
school district. 13 In Leon, the parents moved to disqualify the 
hearing officer prior to the hearing, claiming that he was both 
partial, and unlawfully appointed. The hearing officer was an 
attorney who had represented schools and parents concerning 
special education matters, and who refused to disqualify him-
self after the parents made a request to replace him. The court 
found that the hearing officer was not biased, reasoning that he 
had never represented the school, and that he had once actu-
ally represented a parent in a matter contrary to the school's 
10. Mayson v. Teague, 749 F.2d 652 (ll'h Cir. 1984). 
11. See id. 
12. See id. 
13. Leon v. Board ofEduc., 807 F. Supp. 1278, 1281 (E.D. Mich. 1992) .. 
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interest. 14 
In Evans v. Evans, the Seventh Circuit focused on imparti-
ality issues related to the training of hearing officers. 15 Evans 
centered on a dispute over the cost of residential placement for 
a child with emotional handicaps. After an adverse ruling, the 
parents questioned the impartiality of a second-tier appellate 
board. This board was allegedly appointed and trained by the 
same attorney who represented the state education agency in 
the case against the parents. This same attorney had also pre-
viously functioned as a "legal advisor" to the appellate board in 
other cases. The court ruled that such training programs are 
common in many states and do not transgress the line between 
adjudicator and administrator. The Evans court further stated 
that the combination of investigatory, advisory, and prosecuto-
rial roles does not necessarily violate due process. 16 
In addition to challenges involving the impartiality of 
hearing officers, parents have also questioned their qualifica-
tions. In Board of Education of Jericho Union Free School Dis-
trict, a state administrative review officer ruled that "[t]he fact 
that the hearing officer was not an attorney did not invalidate 
the [due process] proceedings."17 The reviewing officer noted 
that level I hearing officers had to be certified by a state official 
and that they were required to complete a training course. The 
reviewing officer said that no other qualifications were re-
quired.18 
In Lapp v. Board of Education, the court ruled against the 
parents of an elementary school student with a speech impedi-
ment who claimed that the administrative law judge (an attor-
ney) who presided over their case was not knowledgeable about 
special education. 19 The court noted that "impartiality" was the 
only requirement for hearing officers under the IDEA and that 
"neither federal nor state law required any specific qualifica-
tions, background, or training for those appointed to decide due 
14. See id; See also Joseph R. McKinney & Geoff Schultz, Hearing Officers, Case 
Characteristics, And Due Process Hearings, 111 WEST'S ED. LAW REP. 1069, 1070 
(1996). 
15. Evans v. Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ind. 1993). 
1G. Sec id. 
17. Board of Educ. of Jericho Union Free Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 135 (SEA 
N.Y.1998). 
18. See id. 
19. Lapp v. Board of Educ., 28 IDELR 1 (Md, 1997). 
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process disputes". 20 Moreover, the court stated that hearing of-
ficers have broad discretion in determining whether they have 
a conflict of interest that would affect their impartiality. To 
overcome this discretion, parents must provide evidence of 
prejudice or bias, or of a hearing officer's inability to be impar-
tial. 21 
Wojnarowicz v. Duneland School Corporation and Inde-
pendent Department of Education involved parental allegations 
of hearing officer impartiality. 22 Interestingly, a federal district 
court dismissed the lawsuit against the school district but not 
against the state's department of education. In Wojnarowicz, a 
parent, who's son was in a self contained classroom, claimed 
that during a break in the due process hearing, the hearing of-
ficer said that her son was also in a self-contained classroom 
and that she agreed with the school that her son belonged 
there. The parent claimed that this hearing officer, who subse-
quently ruled that the child properly belonged in a self-
contained classroom, had a personal bias that prevented her 
from remaining impartial. Consequently, the parent alleged 
that both the school district (at a first-tier level) and the Indi-
ana Department of Education (at a second-tier hearing) denied 
the child a fair and impartial hearing. The court held that the 
school district had nothing to do with appointing the hearing 
officer and granted the school's motion to dismiss. The court 
found, however, that the Indiana Department of Education was 
a proper party to the lawsuit because it was in charge of ap-
pointing the hearing officer.23 
In Aiello v. Grasmick, several parents in Maryland brought 
challenges to the state's entire due process system: "Maryland 
changed its due process procedures from a two-tiered system to 
a one-tiered system."24 Under the old system, a local hearing 
was held, and then a state level hearing was conducted if either 
party appealed. The new system eliminated the local hearing, 
allowing only a state level hearing of special education dis-
putes. Several parents claimed that the change violated the 
due process procedures of the IDEA, denied their children a 
20. See id. 
21. Okemos Pub. Schs., 29 IDELR 677 (SEA MI, 1998). 
22. Wojnarowicz v. Duneland Sch. Corp. & Ind. Dept. of Educ., 28 IDELR 1197 
(N.D. Ind. 1998). 
23. See id. 
24. Aiello v. Grasmick, 155 F. 3d 557 (4'h Cir. 1998). 
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free, appropriate, public education and violated the State Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act. The Fourth Circuit Court "ana-
lyzed the language of the IDEA and concluded it did not create 
a substantive right to a local due process hearing."25 The court 
found that the IDEA did not contain a provision that would in-
corporate the state statute allowing a local due process hear-
ing.26 
In Lapp, parents challenged the new "subject matter re-
view" quality assurance provisions of the Maryland Education 
Code that was part of the change from a two-tiered to a one-
tiered system.27 The "subject matter review" provision allowed 
review by another hearing officer designated by the Office of 
Administrative Hearings. The purpose of the procedure was to 
ensure that each decision was well written, legally sufficient, 
timely and conformed to a standard format. Parents contended 
that the policy of "subject matter review" violated their consti-
tutional and statutory rights by "allow[ing] an individual with 
no knowledge of the case to review the decision and exercise a 
level of substantive and editorial control completely inconsis-
tent with the independent fact finding and decision making of 
the impartial hearing officer."28 The federal district court dis-
agreed with the parents' argument and held that "subject mat-
ter review" did not violate any constitutional or statutory right, 
nor did it affect the impartiality of the person issuing the deci-
sion. The court noted that internal communication among 
judges (as long as it was not prohibited ex parte communica-
tion) in the context of court administration was permissible 
under the Maryland rules of judicial conduct. 
III. SCHOLARLY INVESTIGATIONS 
Several research investigations have examined the poten-
tial for hearing officer bias and have reached conflicting con-
clusions. 
John Stewart reported that it is the level of experience that 
most significantly influences hearing officer's rulings. Stewart 
concluded that neither occupational background of the hearing 
officer nor the type of issues discussed in the hearing biased 
25. See id. 
26. See id. 
27. Lapp v. Board ofEduc., 28 IDELR 1 (1997). 
28. See id. 
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decision-making.29 
Contrary to Mr. Stewart's findings, a 1991 investigation by 
Ralph Tarola found that: (1) a hearing officer's occupational 
background was significantly related to the outcome of the 
hearing; (2) hearing officers employed by universities and 
school districts were more likely to rule in favor of schools than 
attorneys or private practice psychologists; and (3) the type of 
issue discussed in the hearing was significantly related to the 
decision outcome. 30 
Many studies report that the quality of case presentations 
affect hearing officer decisions. Peter Kuriloff found that in 
Pennsylvania the way parents presented their cases affected 
the results they achieved. Parents who called more witnesses, 
offered more exhibits, and questioned school witnesses more 
thoroughly, received more favorable decisions. 31 Similarly, 
Linda O'Conner Rhen reported that parents also prevailed 
more often when they were represented by advocates or legal 
counsel. For the same reason, because schools reportedly used 
legal counsel more often than parents did, the schools won sig-
nificantly more special education hearings. 32 
Data has also indicated a strong dissatisfaction with special 
education due process, especially from parents. For example, a 
five-year Virginia study by Steven Goldberg and Peter Kuriloff 
revealed that nearly ninety percent of the school administra-
tors interviewed thought special education hearings were fair, 
while only forty-one percent of the parents agreed. 33 The par-
ents particularly complained about the accuracy in reporting 
facts and the extent to which the decision was based on actual 
evidence. This satisfaction was seemingly related to whether a 
party won or lost the hearing. Because schools tended to win 
29. John Stewart, An Investigation of Predispositions for Placement of Handi· 
capped Children by Special Education Due Process Hearing Officers 
(1987)(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Auburn University)(on file with Auburn Uni-
versity). 
30. Ralph Tarola, The Relationship Between Sele Law & Contemporary Problems 
(1991) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Lehigh University)(on file with Lehigh Univer-
sity}. 
31. Peter Kuriloff, Is Justice Served by Due Process?: Affecting the Outcome of 
SpecialEducation Hearings in Pennsylvania, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs., 89, 100 (Win-
ter 1985 Number 1). 
32. Linda 0' Connor Rhen, An Analysis of Special Education Due Process Hear-
ings in Pennsylvania (1977-1986) (1989) (Ed.D. dissertation, Temple University). 
33. Steven S. Goldberg & Peter J. Kuriloff, Evaluating The Fairness of Special 
Education Hearings, 57 Exceptional Children 546 (1991). 
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more in special education hearings, they reported a higher level 
of satisfaction with the outcome.34 
In the end, the desirable outcome of any special education 
dispute is that the conflict be resolved prior to conducting a due 
process hearing. When this end is accomplished, the parties in-
volved save considerable cost and reach agreements that tend 
to be mutually acceptable. 
When the parties are unable to resolve their differences 
among themselves, a formal hearing must be convened and a 
decision rendered that favors one party over the other. In these 
instances, the cost to the parties is often substantial both in 
terms of money and goodwill. 
In keeping with the purpose of this paper, the authors hy-
pothesize that a hearing officer's occupational background, 
gender, and years of experience affect the manner in which he 
or she resolves disagreements between parents and schools. 
Likewise the presence of an attorney for the parents, as well as 
the type of issues to be resolved, are factors believed to influ-
ence the results of special education due process hearings. 
IV. METHODS 
The data for this study was extracted from 227 cases that 
were assigned to fourteen hearing officers, in a midwestern 
state, during the 1992-1996 calendar years. Seven of the hear-
ing officers were attorneys and seven were non-attorneys (five 
university professors and two private practice psychologists). 
Each hearing officer had four to twenty years experience. 
Eleven of the hearing officers were men, and three were 
women. The assigned cases involved disputes between parents 
and special education personnel related to the following types 
of issues: a) eligibility for special education services, b) test re-
sults interpretation, c) education program/placement, and d) 
parent reimbursement for educational costs. The cases were 
systematically rotated with each hearing officer receiving ap-
proximately twenty to twenty five assignments during the 
forty-eight month period. 
A discriminate function analysis was used to determine 
which dependent variables best predicted the due process out-
comes of interest in the study. The first function was whether a 
34. See id. 
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case settled (N=133) or went to a decision (N=94). The other 
function of interest was whether the hearing officer rulings 
were favorable (N=90) or unfavorable (N=lll) to the parents. 
Two types of dependent variables were used for prediction pur-
poses that included a subset of hearing officer background 
characteristics (i.e., occupational background, gender, and 
years of experience) and case factors (i.e., parent representa-
tion and the four types of possible hearing issues). 
V. RESULTS 
The variable correlations are given in Table 1. Examining 
these for the first function, the presence of an attorney hearing 
officer is the primary variable (r = .47) for predicting whether a 
case settles before going to hearing. Parent representation (r = 
.28) and the presence of a special education program/placement 
issues (r = -.24) are revealed to be secondarily involved. At the 
same time, the most significant factor predicting rulings is the 
presence of counsel for the parent (r = .38). On the other hand, 
special education disputes over program/placement (r = -.27) 
issues adversely affect rulings for parents. 
Table 1. 
Discriminant Function-Variable Correlations for Hearing Of-
ficer Background and Case Characteristics 
Variables for Parents Settlement Ruling 
(N=201) Outcome (N=227) 
Hearing Officer Background 
Legal Background .47** .15 
Years of Experience .11 .18 
Gender .18 .15 
Case Characteristics 
Parent Representation .28* .38** 
Eligibility Issue .10 -.21 
Evaluation Issue .13 -.17 
Program Placement Issue -.24* -.27* 
Cost issue -.16 -.22 
* p< .05 **p< .01 
A discriminant function analysis determined that a three-
variable model was the strongest predictor of a dispute settle-
17] SPECIAL EDUCATION DUE PROCESS 27 
ment, yielding a maximum R=.51, p < .01. The presence of an 
attorney-hearing officer was a strong predictor of a case ending 
in settlement, F (1, 225) = 29.12, p < .01. A parent represented 
by an attorney or advocate also predicted a greater likelihood of 
the dispute being resolved prior to hearing, F (2, 224) = 18. 7, 
p< .01. On the other hand, hearings involving an issue related 
to special education program/placement significantly improved 
chances of the dispute being heard, F(3, 223) = 16.8, p < .01. 
The discriminant equation using standardized coefficients to 
predict decision outcomes is presented in Figure 1. This equa-
tion accurately predicted settlement outcomes in 64% of the 
cases. 
Figure 1. Model for prediction of Settlement Outcomes 
Settlement Outcome = 33.67 + 1.03 (Legal Background of 
Hearing Officer) + .81 (Parent Representation) - . 77 (Pro-
gram/Placement Issue) 
The same discriminate analysis was used to predict the 
hearing officer rulings for or against the parents. A two-
variable model proved to be the best predictor of this outcome, 
yielding a maximum R = 24, p < .05. The presence of an attor-
ney/advocate for the parents significantly improved their 
chances of receiving a favorable ruling F(l, 199) =. 7.69. How-
ever, disputes over special education program/placement issues 
were more likely to be won by the schools F(2,198) = 4. 78, p < 
.05. The discriminant equation using standardized coefficients 
to predict decision outcomes is presented in Figure 2. This 
equation correctly grouped 58% of the case rulings rendered on 
behalf of parents by the hearing officers in the study. 
Figure 2. Model for prediction of Rulings for Parents 
Rulings for Parents = 28.6 + 1.05 (Parent Representation) - .82 
(Program and Placement Issue) 
VI. DISCUSSION 
The Use of Non-Attorneys. These findings indicate that the 
legal background of the hearing officer is significantly related 
to whether a hearing is settled. That is, attorney-hearing offi-
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cers presided over a lower proportion of due process hearings 
than their non-attorney counterparts. One possible explanation 
for this difference is that non-attorneys may believe that the 
best way to contribute to solving an educational dispute is to 
provide the parties with a forum to air differences. Non-
attorneys seemingly view hearings as being less adversarial 
than do attorneys, valuing the hearing as an opportunity for 
mediation and shared decision-making. Conversely, attorneys 
may be more accustomed to seeking settlement prior to adjudi-
cation, believing that this solution is less time consuming, less 
expensive, and provides more opportunity for reconciliation. 
Indeed, in North Carolina, hearing officers (48% were non-
lawyers) listed providing expertise and solutions to special edu-
cational problems as the most important reason for their inter-
est in serving as hearings officers. 35 
It is also possible that an educational orientation, rather 
than a legal background, motivates non-attorneys (e.g., univer-
sity professors) to ensure that children receive a free, appropri-
ate, public education regardless of lost time, expense, and 
goodwill. In addition, non-lawyers may view the hearing as a 
platform where they can interject their educational opinions 
and give informed insight on how to provide a better education 
for the student. Unfortunately, these particular practices may 
prevent settlements, and cost all involved significantly more 
than may be otherwise necessary. Ironically, Donald M. Sacken 
has pointed out that in order to avoid bias "one must eliminate 
those most knowledgeable about the substantive issues to be 
resolved." 36 Indeed, non-attorneys may be prone to this sort of 
bias.37 
Parent Representation. Much has been written on the sig-
nificant impact lawyers have had on public education. While 
the total amount of litigation greatly increased from the 1960s 
to the middle of the 1970s, and began to decrease modestly un-
til the late 1980s, litigation rates remain at historically high 
levels today. Moreover, special education disputes have been 
found to contribute significantly to this phenomenon and con-
35. Ann P. Turnbull, et al. Due Process Hearing Officers: Characteristics, Needs, 
and Appointment Criteria, 48 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 48, 50 (1981). 
36. Donald M. Sacken, Mayson v. Teague: The Dilemma of Selecting Hearing Offi-
cers, 16 J.L. & EDUC.187, 200 (1987). 
37. See id. 
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tinue to grow at an alarming rate. 38 
Nevertheless, this four-year study indicates that when a 
parent retains counsel, the case is less likely to result in a 
hearing being convened. These results seem surprising, but a 
thoughtful review of the issue leads one to conclude that the 
use of an attorney by either party may often lead to an early 
resolution of the dispute. It is a fact that most legal cases that 
involve lawyers do not go to trial. Attorneys are accustomed to 
the settlement process and many of them bring that negotiat-
ing dimension of practicing law to the hearing. In addition, in 
those instances when a parent retains counsel, strong incentive 
may arise on the part of the school to settle, thus avoiding par-
ent attorney fees, should they in fact lose the case. 
These findings also reveal that parents operate on a "level 
playing field" when they are represented by someone with ap-
propriate legal expertise. Special education law is a highly 
complex legal area and parents win more cases when repre-
sented by an individual with legal knowledge. This improved 
winning percentage may also be abetted when parents are 
counseled by an attorney to consider settlement, avoiding the 
possibility of an unfavorable ruling, particularly in cases they 
have a minimal chance of winning. 
Program/ Placement Issues. The study indicates that a 
hearing that focuses on an educational program/placement is-
sue is less likely to be settled. This finding is not surprising 
given that schools assume strong ownership of these decisions, 
especially when parents request expensive program and 
placement options (e.g., residential programs). Schools are par-
ticularly inflexible when they believe their recommended edu-
cational plan can benefit the student at less cost. Of course, 
parents are just as adamant about providing their child with 
the best program possible, regardless of the expense to the 
school. Because of the compelling feelings of both parties, a 
hearing is often required to resolve their strong differences of 
opinion. Under these circumstances, the study predicted that 
the hearing officers would rule against the parents on issues of 
educational program/placement. Although the parents are ac-
knowledged to play an important role, decisions about appro-
priate methodology and beneficial school placement are likely 
38. MARTHA MACARTHY & NELDA CAMBRON-MCCABE, PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 17 
(Allyn & Bacon ed., 1992). 
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viewed to fall primarily within the school's prerogative, par-
ticularly when the school can prove that an educational benefit 
has been provided. 
These findings support the notion that the outcome of a due 
process hearing can be predicted by the legal background of the 
hearing officer. The results are intriguing because they seem 
contrary to the role attorneys are believed to play in prolonging 
costly and adversarial disputes. Interestingly, the question be-
comes: Does the non-attorney hearing officer's approach un-
dermine the litigants' ability to reach mutual settlement, save 
time and money, and avoid emotionally charged disputes? 
The use of an attorney (or advocate) by the parent also con-
tributes to the increased chance of settlement. As mentioned 
above, the presence of these representatives on behalf of par-
ents may put the school in a position where they are more in-
clined to seek settlement to avoid high attorney fees and other 
costs of a hearing. The only instances where these cost incen-
tives are probably immaterial are when parents overly intrude 
into the educational decision-making, especially when seeking 
expensive program and placement options. In these instances, 
the cost-and-balances of conducting the hearing are less than 
conceding to the parent demands. 
The background of the hearing officer does not appear to 
bias his or her decision against the parents. What better pre-
dicts a favorable outcome for parents is the retention of counsel 
or an advocate before entering the hearing process. Certainly, 
this action increases the chances of prevailing. Retaining rep-
resentation probably helps parents avoid entering a hearing 
they have little chance of winning - an outcome that has the po-
tential to drain them financially and emotionally, and further 
embitter their relationship with the school. 
Finally, some limitations of this study should be noted. 
First, given the exploratory nature and the small sample of 
hearing officers involved, the results need to be interpreted 
with these limitations in mind. In addition, the study only rep-
resents due process activities as they occurred in one jurisdic-
tion; therefore, these findings may only apply to states and lo-
cales that operate in a similar fashion in resolving special 
education disputes between parents and schools. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The role of the hearing officer is similar to that of an ad-
ministrative law judge. The primary duties of this individual 
are to inform the parties of their rights, allow all parties to pre-
sent their case, conduct the hearing in a fair manner, and ren-
der a decision in accordance with the law. Each state maintains 
a list of persons who may serve as hearing officers that in-
cludes a statement of the qualifications of each of those per-
sons. Either party may challenge the appointment of a par-
ticular hearing officer. 
To ensure the impartiality of hearing officers, many states 
have adopted requirements for appointment and retention of 
hearing officers similar to those found in the federal Adminis-
trative Procedures Act (APA). The APA requires that all hear-
ing officers must be: a) assigned cases on a rotation, b) removed 
only for cause as determined by an independent board, c) not 
removable by the agency who appointed the hearing officer, 
and d) compensated independent of the appointing agency. 
Each state education agency varies as to how well they in-
sulate the hearing officer from personal and professional pres-
sures that may influence impartiality. Moreover, current litiga-
tion and ongoing scholarly research indicates a growing 
concern with hearing officer impartiality in special education 
due process proceedings. 
